Compliance
Which SOC 2, ISO 27001, and GDPR controls the plugins can contribute to, and what is still up to you.
Not legal advice: informational guidance only
This page provides general, non-binding technical information about how these plugins may support selected security, privacy, and compliance controls.
It does not constitute legal advice, data protection advice, compliance advice, an audit opinion, or a certification. The control mappings are illustrative interpretations based on the plugins' functionality. They are not official interpretations, endorsements, or certifications by AICPA, ISO, NIST, or any regulatory authority.
Using these plugins does not make an application or organization compliant with SOC 2, ISO 27001, GDPR, or any other framework or regulation. No guarantee is made that an auditor, certification body, or supervisory authority will accept any particular implementation as satisfying a requirement.
Whether a control is applicable or effective depends on your specific organization, processing activities, configuration, infrastructure, policies, procedures, and supporting evidence. You remain responsible for assessing and meeting your applicable obligations.
Consult qualified legal counsel, your data protection officer, and your independent auditor to determine which requirements apply and how they should be implemented. Always verify requirements against the current authoritative standards and legislation.
For each plugin: the controls it can contribute to, how, and what is left to you. The end of the page lists known gaps and what no plugin here covers.
Frameworks
| Framework | Version | IDs on this page |
|---|---|---|
| SOC 2 | AICPA Trust Services Criteria 2017 (TSP section 100) | CC6.1, P4.2, ... |
| ISO 27001 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Annex A (titles as in ISO/IEC 27002:2022) | A.8.15, ... |
| GDPR | Regulation (EU) 2016/679 | Art. 32, Art. 5(1)(e), ... |
| NIST | SP 800-63B-4, Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication (2025), passwords and account notifications | §3.1.1.2, §4.6, ... |
The SOC 2, GDPR, and NIST IDs were checked against the published texts in November 2026. ISO standards aren't freely available: check the ISO control titles against your copy.
The SOC 2 mappings are based on the 2017 Trust Services Criteria and the applicable revised points of focus. On October 28, 2026, the AICPA published a proposed 2027 revision as an exposure draft. The proposal includes restructuring and revisions to the criteria and may change existing control references. It is not yet final. Confirm the applicable criteria and mappings with your auditor, particularly if your organization plans to use the proposed framework.
At a glance
The mappings below are illustrative and describe potential contributions of the plugins to selected controls. They are not exhaustive compliance mappings and do not establish that a control is implemented or effective. The applicability and sufficiency of each control must be assessed in the context of your organization's risks, policies, processes, and supporting evidence, together with your auditor or qualified adviser.
| Plugin | SOC 2 | ISO 27001 | GDPR | NIST SP 800-63B-4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Audit log | CC6.2, CC6.3, CC7.2, CC7.3, P4.2, P4.3 | A.5.28, A.8.2, A.8.10, A.8.11, A.8.15, A.8.16 | Art. 5(1)(c), 5(1)(e), 15, 32, 33 | - |
| Authentication | CC6.1 | A.5.16, A.8.5 | Art. 5(1)(c) | - |
| Blocklist | CC6.1, CC6.2, CC6.6 | A.5.16, A.5.17, A.8.5 | Art. 32 | §3.1.1.2 |
| Normalize | CC6.2 | A.5.16 | Art. 5(1)(c), 5(1)(d) | - |
| Referral | - | - | Art. 5(1)(c), 17 | - |
| Security alerts | CC7.2, CC7.3, CC7.4 | A.5.17, A.5.26, A.8.16 | Art. 32 | §4.1.2.1, §4.2, §4.3, §4.6 |
| Waitlist | CC6.2, P2.1 | A.5.16, A.5.34 | Art. 5(1)(e), 7, 17 | - |
The referral plugin isn't a security control. It is listed for the personal data it stores.
GDPR compliance depends on the purposes and circumstances of the processing, not only on what a plugin stores:
- Pseudonymous ids are still personal data when they can be linked to a person. Storing user ids instead of names or emails can support data minimization; it doesn't take the data out of the GDPR.
- Data minimization is contextual. Fewer fields don't by themselves satisfy Art. 5(1)(c): the data must be adequate, relevant, and limited to what your purpose needs.
- Storage limitation needs operation. An optional retention feature doesn't establish that data is deleted once it is no longer needed.
- Deletion isn't the whole of erasure. Rows deleted by a plugin can still exist in backups, logs, and other copies, and legal retention obligations may require you to keep some data.
Audit log
The audit log records sign-ins, failed sign-ins, account changes, and admin actions, and the events of the other plugins.
| Control | How the plugin can contribute |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 CC7.2 (monitors for anomalies), ISO A.8.16 (Monitoring activities) | Failed sign-ins, blocked requests, and admin actions with a severity; destinations forward them to your monitoring or SIEM (best effort; httpDestination can sign requests) |
| SOC 2 CC7.3 (evaluates security events), GDPR Art. 33 | Audit events provide evidence that can help investigate security incidents and assess whether a personal data breach requires notification under Art. 33. The organization remains responsible for assessing and making any required notifications within the applicable deadlines |
| SOC 2 CC6.2, CC6.3 (registers, authorizes, modifies, removes access), ISO A.8.2 (Privileged access rights) | Sign-ups, role changes, bans, impersonation, and deleted users, with the admin who did it: evidence for access reviews |
| ISO A.8.15 (Logging), A.5.28 (Collection of evidence), GDPR Art. 32(1)(b) | Events in their own table. The optional hash chain, off by default, can help detect certain changes or deletions of recorded events when enabled. destinations can keep a copy in a separately controlled log store, which can help when the application database itself is compromised |
| SOC 2 P4.2, P4.3, ISO A.8.10 (Information deletion), GDPR Art. 5(1)(e) | The opt-in retention deletes eligible audit events when cleanup runs. This can support retention and deletion controls, but backups and other copies remain your responsibility |
| ISO A.8.11 (Data masking), GDPR Art. 5(1)(c) | captureIp and captureUserAgent turn data off; beforeLog can pseudonymize it; metadata under recognized secret-related keys is redacted (see below) |
| ISO A.5.28 (Collection of evidence) | Admins can export events as NDJSON or CSV for auditors and evidence requests, and verify the hash chain over HTTP or from a job |
| GDPR Art. 15 | Users can list their own audit events. This may support an access request, but it does not provide a complete export of all personal data processed by the organization |
Left to you:
- Set
retention. It is opt-in: without it, audit events are not automatically deleted. If IP capture is enabled (captureIp, on by default), those addresses remain in the stored events. The automatic sweep is started by recorded events, so it isn't a guaranteed periodic cleanup. Configure retention explicitly and scheduledeleteExpiredAuditEventsif you require predictable periodic cleanup. The plugin does not replace your organization's retention policy or determine which retention period is legally appropriate; document the period in your privacy policy. - Look at the log. Recording is not monitoring: alert on critical
events (
destinations) and review admin actions regularly. - Destinations receive personal data. Events carry user ids, IP
addresses, user agents, and sometimes email addresses. A SIEM or log
service you forward them to is a processor: cover it in your records of
processing and data processing agreements, and use
transformorbeforeLogto send less. - Check that forwarding works. Destinations are best effort: failed
sends are logged, not retried, and events waiting in a batch are lost
if the process stops. Watch for
[audit-log] destinationerrors, and keep the database storage as the record if every event must arrive. - Protect the log. Restrict who can write to the database. The hash chain does not independently protect against an attacker who can modify both the event database and the chain key. For stronger tamper evidence, protect the chain key separately and retain the latest chain hash in an independently controlled location, see what the chain protects against.
- Secrets in metadata. Metadata values under recognized
secret-related property names (
password,token,secret,apiKey, ...) are recursively redacted. This is key-name-based protection, not comprehensive secret detection. Avoid placing sensitive values under unrelated property names, and make sure custombeforeLogtransformations, which run after the redaction, don't reintroduce secrets. - Erasure requests. Events are kept when a user is deleted. Delete or pseudonymize their events yourself, see Privacy.
- Clock synchronization (ISO A.8.17): Audit events use the application server's clock. You are responsible for synchronizing your servers and other relevant systems to approved time sources.
Authentication
The authentication plugin adds sign-in with Steam, Epic Games, and Xbox.
| Control | How the plugin can contribute |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 CC6.1, ISO A.8.5 (Secure authentication), A.5.16 (Identity management) | Users are identified by the provider's account id; your app stores no password for them |
| GDPR Art. 5(1)(c) | By default, the plugin generates a placeholder email address and does not request a real email address from the provider. Your custom mapProfileToUser implementation can override this behavior. Whether the remaining profile fields are necessary depends on your application's purpose |
Left to you:
- The provider decides how secure the sign-in is. Two-step verification on Steam, Epic, or Xbox is the player's choice; you can't require it. Add better-auth's two-factor plugin if your app needs a second factor of its own.
- You can't email these users. Their placeholder emails receive nothing: no password resets, no security notices, no breach notification. Ask for a real email if you need to reach them.
Blocklist
The blocklist stops disallowed emails, usernames, names, passwords, and IP addresses.
| Control | How the plugin can contribute |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 CC6.1, ISO A.5.17 (Authentication information), A.8.5 | Password rules and the context check (the email, username, or app name in a password), on every endpoint that sets a password |
| NIST SP 800-63B-4 §3.1.1.2 | Exact, whole-password matching can support the NIST password blocklist requirement, provided the application supplies an appropriate list of commonly used, expected, and compromised passwords. The plugin also supports additional matching modes and context-word checks; these are application-specific restrictions and should not be presented as the NIST-required comparison |
| SOC 2 CC6.2, ISO A.5.16 | With the predefined lists, disposable email domains and reserved usernames (admin, support) can't register, also through OAuth and admin endpoints |
| SOC 2 CC6.6 (threats from outside the system), GDPR Art. 32 | IP addresses, ranges, and countries can be kept from signing up or signing in |
Left to you:
- The password list itself. The plugin doesn't ship a list of
common passwords. For the NIST comparison, supply commonly used and
expected passwords as
exactrules (the default rule type), and check for compromised passwords with better-auth'shaveIBeenPwnedplugin. - The extra checks are your policy.
prefix,suffix, andcontainsrules, as well asregexpatterns that match substrings, can reject passwords based on parts of their contents. The context check also compares context-derived words against the password. These are additional restrictions beyond NIST's whole-password blocklist comparison. Consider whether they reject legitimate passphrases, and turn the context check off withcheckContext: falseif necessary. - Password length. Set by better-auth (
emailAndPassword.minPasswordLength, 8 by default). NIST asks for at least 15 characters when the password is the only factor, 8 with a second factor. - Failed attempts per account (NIST §3.2.2): not counted by any plugin here. better-auth's rate limiter counts per IP address.
- IP rules are not a network control. They keep out casual abuse, not someone with a VPN; your firewall or WAF is the network control.
Normalize
The normalize plugin stores the normalized form of each email address and phone number, so one person can't hold several accounts under different spellings of one address.
| Control | How the plugin can contribute |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 CC6.2 (registers users before access), ISO A.5.16 (Identity management) | One account per inbox and per phone number, on every way of creating a user, which helps keep identities unique. Privacy relays are separate addresses and still count as separate people |
| GDPR Art. 5(1)(d) (accuracy) | Phone numbers are stored in one format (E.164), and invalid ones are refused |
| GDPR Art. 5(1)(c) (data minimisation) | Adds one derived field, normalizedEmail, which is personal data like the email itself and is never sent to clients. Deleted with the user by better-auth |
Left to you:
- Fill existing users. Until
backfillNormalizedEmailshas run, aliases of existing users can still sign up, and inboxes that already have two accounts need a decision about which one stays. - List the field in your records of processing, next to the email address.
Referral
The referral plugin stores who referred whom, and the steps toward a reward.
| Control | How the plugin can contribute |
|---|---|
| GDPR Art. 5(1)(c) | Stores user ids, not emails or names. The ids are still personal data, and step metadata is whatever your server passes |
| GDPR Art. 17 | Codes, referrals, steps, and places are deleted with the user, on every adapter. This can support erasure; backups, audit logs, and other copies are yours to handle |
Left to you:
- Keep step metadata small. Whatever you pass is stored, and it can contain personal data.
- Say in your privacy policy that referrals are recorded, if you pay rewards or show them.
Security alerts
The security alerts plugin tells users about sign-ins from new devices and changes to their credentials, and lets them lock an intruder out with a "This wasn't me" link.
| Control | How the plugin can contribute |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 CC7.2 (monitors for anomalies), ISO A.8.16 (Monitoring activities) | Sign-ins from devices not seen before, and changes to passwords, email addresses, passkeys, two-factor, linked accounts, and API keys, are reported to the account owner, who can tell an anomaly from a legitimate change |
| SOC 2 CC7.3 (evaluates security events), CC7.4 (responds to security incidents), ISO A.5.26 (Response to information security incidents) | The "This wasn't me" link signs out every session and blocks the password, a first containment step the user can take without waiting for support; with the audit log, security.account-secured records it |
| ISO A.5.17 (Authentication information), NIST §4.3, §3.1.1.2 | With password: "block", a password reported as compromised stops working and has to be reset |
| NIST §4.1.2.1 (binding an additional authenticator), §4.2 (account recovery), §4.6 (account notifications) | Alerts when a passkey is added, when a password reset is requested and done, and when the email address changes (to the old address), sent by your own mail or SMS, outside the request that made the change |
| GDPR Art. 32(1)(b) | Telling users about changes to their account can support the ongoing confidentiality and integrity of their accounts |
Left to you:
- Send the alerts. The plugin decides when to alert;
sendAlertis your code. Make it reliable, and watch thesendAlert threw an errorlog lines (orsecurity.alert-sentevents withstatus: "failure"). - Instructions and contact. NIST §4.6 asks for clear instructions, including contact information, in case the user doesn't recognize the event. Put them in your alert template, next to the link.
- More than one notification address. NIST §4.6 asks for at least two
per account; the plugin sends to the account's email (the old one for
email-changed). A second address or a phone number is yours to add insendAlert. - Respond to reports. A secured account is a reported incident: look at it (the audit log helps), and decide whether more is needed.
- Not a breach notification. An alert tells a user about their own account. It isn't the communication to data subjects of GDPR Art. 34, nor a notification to the supervisory authority (Art. 33).
- Device data.
knownDeviceholds a keyed hash and a label like "Chrome on macOS" per device, deleted with the user. List it in your records of processing, see Personal data.
Waitlist
The waitlist gates sign-up behind admin approval.
| Control | How the plugin can contribute |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 CC6.2 (registers and authorizes new users before access), ISO A.5.16 | Every way of creating a user is gated: only approved emails (and what you let through with allow or bypass) get an account; with the audit log, approvals are recorded |
| SOC 2 P2.1, GDPR Art. 7 | Double opt-in verifies the email address before an entry counts, and the leave link lets a person leave the waitlist and deletes the entry. These features can support a consent process, but they do not establish or record valid consent by themselves (see below) |
| GDPR Art. 5(1)(e), ISO A.5.34 (Privacy and protection of PII) | Unconfirmed entries are deleted once their link has expired, and with the opt-in retention, rejected and registered entries after the period you choose. This can support storage limitation; backups and other copies remain your responsibility |
| GDPR Art. 17 | A deleted user's entry, which holds their email address, is deleted with them. This can support erasure; audit events and other copies are yours to handle |
Left to you:
- Email verification is not proof of consent. The confirmation link
verifies control of the email address and records that the person
confirmed their waitlist entry;
confirmedAtrecords when. If consent is your legal basis, you must also present a clear, specific consent statement and retain evidence of what the person agreed to, when, and how. Store the relevant purpose and notice version alongside the confirmation: pass them asmetadatain the join request; it is stored with the entry. With the audit log, confirmations (waitlist.confirmed) and people leaving (waitlist.left) are also recorded there, and the record of leaving remains after the entry is deleted. Those events contain the email address; the audit log's retention period applies to them. - Direct invitations skip email verification. An admin can invite an
unconfirmed email directly (
createInvite). The application must determine and document the appropriate legal basis for processing that email address. If consent is the legal basis, obtain and retain evidence of valid consent separately. - Old entries. Rejected and registered entries are kept until an
admin deletes them, unless you set
retention. Choose periods that fit your purpose, see Privacy. The cleanup is started by waitlist requests; scheduledeleteExpiredWaitlistEntriesif you need predictable periodic cleanup. - Deleted users. Their entry, which holds the email address, is deleted with them.
Known gaps
Things the plugins don't do yet, so you don't find out in an audit:
- Deleting a user keeps their audit events. That is on purpose (a security log has to outlive the accounts it is about), but erasure requests need a decision: delete or pseudonymize those events yourself, see the audit log's Privacy section. The Personal data table lists every table.
- No self-service export for users. Admins can export audit events; users can only list their own, so an access request still needs an admin.
- No account lockout. Failed sign-ins are recorded and rate limited per IP address, not counted per account.
Not covered
Common audit topics that none of these plugins touch. better-auth itself, your infrastructure, or your organization covers them:
- Multi-factor authentication and passkeys: better-auth's two-factor and passkey plugins.
- Session lifetime and revocation: better-auth's session options.
- Encryption at rest and backups: your database.
- Access reviews, policies, training, and incident response: your organization.